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Max Isenberght
H. N. Hirsch' puts forth several enigmas of Felix Frankfurter without
saying which he regards as the enigma of his title. Perhaps others will
simply know which it is from Professor Hirsch's exegesis or from specific
signals that I failed to perceive. On my reading it could just as well be
"puzzling questions about Frankfurter's judicial performance"' as clashes
within Frankfurter's personality-his being "witty, charming, warm, en-
ergized, [and] sparkling"3 but also "nervous, arrogant, domineering," and
given to "sycophantic flattery [and] obsessive concern with the motives of
his judicial opponents mixed with high-pitched anger at their behavior
and doctrines.""
Or it could be the polar disparity of responses Frankfurter drew from
others. "He had scores of friends whom he loved and who loved him
... . Few men in the twentieth century have had the devoted loyalty of
so many."' Yet "[tlhere is [to the contrary] his history of difficult interper-
sonal relationships. [His] tendency to domineer [sic] the individuals closest
to him was so evident that it contributed to mental breakdown in his
wife .. ."6
Still again, it may be none of the above or any of the several other
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particular enigmas Professor Hirsch spells out, but one of a different or-
der, a single grand enigma he may count upon readers to synthesize for
themselves, possibly something as simple as this: that pervasively in his
thoughts and acts Felix Frankfurter was both good and bad.
None of these hypotheses satisfies. Ambivalence, intellectual and emo-
tional, is a nearly universal trait. It is not the enigma of Felix Frankfurter
but of the human race that everybody is, to borrow words from mathema-
ticians, as much a vectorial sum of opposing magnitudes as an integral of
homogeneous series. Why then should Professor Hirsch be struck and ex-
pect his readers to be struck that Felix Frankfurter, a man of so much
talent, brains, and affection that fanciers of our species looked upon him
as a collector's item, was not a monolith?
I do not mean merely to carp at the title. Indeed, whether or not the
self-contradictions, paradoxes, and conundrums in his life can fairly be
said to have made up the enigma of Felix Frankfurter, they are arrest-
ing-and revealing, too. So much so that one cannot quarrel with a con-
scientious biographer for choosing them as his central theme.
My grievance is not that. It has to do with Professor Hirsch's analysis
and his judgment. The trace of naivete or humbug I thought I saw in
advertising enigma as the paramount quality of the man Reinhold
Niebuhr described as "the most vital and creative person I have ever
known"' led me to wonder whether naivete or humbug pervaded the
whole book.
Take the assertion that Frankfurter's tendency to dominate those closest
to him "contributed to mental breakdown in his wife."8 How in the world
can Hirsch be "absolutely clear" about that? How can he dare to make
any pronouncement at all about a relationship-this one truly enig-
matic-between two people who may have had little understanding of it
themselves, and who, until Hirsch came along, succeeded in keeping it
private, despite the curiosity of scores, possibly hundreds, of Frankfurter
watchers, some of them privileged, as Hirsch never was, to observe the
menage at close range?
He rushes in nevertheless. To begin with, he loads his question. By
referring to Marion's "nervous breakdown," her "mental breakdown,"
her "hospitalization," her being "institutionalized," and the like, Hirsch
gives the impression that at some time or times during their marriage she
suffered from a psychological disorder graver by far than the common-
place neuroses of our age of anxiety. If he meant to give that impression,
he owed it to his readers to explain why. If not, he has committed a
7. Quoted in Wallace Mendelson's introduction to FELIX FRANKFURTER: THE JUDGE (W. Men-
delson ed. 1964).
8. See p. 208.
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calumny.
His answer is no more responsible than his question. The sources he
cites to support a conclusion that Felix was to blame for Marion's emo-
tional troubles simply do not bear him out. The first in both order and
emphasis is a book on Frankfurter's diaries by Joseph Lash, whom
Hirsch paraphrases and quotes as follows:
Citing interviews with, among others, the late Alexander Bickel, Jo-
seph Lash writes that "there were friends who thought that the neu-
rasthenia that put [Marion] intermittently under psychiatric care in
the Twenties was rooted in some inner resistance to her marriage, as
if she were never able to resolve her problems of living with a
dynamo-a Jewish one at that..
Right off the bat, readers of this journal will recognize the quotation as
three-tiered hearsay-what Lash said of what Bickel said of what others
said about Marion and Felix. Beyond that, if we were to treat Lash's
imputation to Bickel and others as if it were direct testimony of unchal-
lengeable veracity, the passage would still do nothing for Professor
Hirsch's thesis. Marion's "inner resistance to her marriage" and her in-
ability to live with "a dynamo-a Jewish one at that" are as consistent
with an hypothesis of blamefulness on her part as on his, or for that mat-
ter, of blamelessness on both sides, or of any other permutation one can
construct.
If we look carefully at all the other support Hirsch offers for his con-
demnation of Felix's effect upon Marion's psyche, his thesis droops still
more. Thus, he cites the statement Gardner Jackson made for the Colum-
bia Oral History Collection:
Felix told me he was very much worried about her and said that if I
would only agree to have her take on the co-editorship of this book
of letters [of Sacco and Vanzetti] with me, he thought, and the psy-
chiatrist thought, that it would be a very great therapeutic value ....
[I]n the course of the case. . .I did become the confidant of
Marion and received from her expressions of the difficulties she had
encountered in having married a Jew, and the social pressure to
which she was subjected, and her inner struggle against this complex
of circumstances. More than that, of course, Felix, being the kind of
human being he is, or was and still is pretty much, made for difficul-
ties. He is such a vital, dynamic, aggressive personality that that in
itself was a difficulty, let alone the fact of being Jewish.'0
9. P. 83 (quoting J. LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 83 (1975)).
10. P. 84 (quoting statement of Gardner Jackson, Columbia Oral History Collection 295-96).
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Let me break the thread for a moment. It was not Marion Frank-
furter's way to have confidants. If, contrary to any suggestion in the writ-
ings of those who knew her best," she ever did have a confidant, it was
not Gardner Jackson. Moreover, even if we accept Jackson's bumblings as
gospel and give them the utmost probative force they will bear, they too
leave Professor Hirsch's thesis unsupported.
So does the other "evidence" Professor Hirsch adduces. He asserts, for
example, that "correspondence between Frankfurter and Marion" shows
that "Frankfurter dominated Marion. . . [, that] psychoanalysis gave her
the strength to stand up to him. . . . [,and that] Marion herself accused
Frankfurter of being insensitive to her problems." 2 But what he quotes
from the letters themselves-from Felix's: "I have been thinking . . . to
what extent . . . your mind is more inhibited . . . when I'm about"; 13
from Marion's: "[S]top worrying about me . . . . I appreciate what a
triumph it is for you to discipline yourself to being calm and matter-of-
fact for my sake. . .. That it's our problem instead of mine alone brings
us only closer together" 4-points quite the other way.
The only other "support" Hirsch comes up with is a letter written in
1933 to a doctor in London by Dr. Alfred Cohn, whom Hirsch correctly
identifies as "one of Frankfurter's closest friends": 5
Mrs. Frankfurter has been psychoanalyzed . . . . Felix is sympa-
thetic and is liable to be quixotic and not adequately critical . . . ;
he may indeed go so far as to misinterpret. . . thinking she is going
on gallantly when in fact she is on the verge of a break.'
Any first year law student beginning to have a sense of what is proof
and what is not will know that Hirsch's whole essay on the relationship
between Felix and Marion is dismissable on a demurrer. 7
Would that every reader of The Enigma were given some such anti-
dote to Hirsch's treatment of Felix's behavior toward Marion as Henry
A. Murray's words on the subject. Dr. Murray, at one time head of the
department of psychiatry of Harvard Medical School, met Marion in the
late twenties as his patient. He soon became a close friend of both Frank-
11. See, e.g., Kanin, Trips to Felix, in FELIX FRANKFURTER: A TRIBUTE 34 (W. Mendelson ed.




15. P. 238 n.74.
16. P. 225 n.60.
17. For the unlikely errant non-lawyer coming upon this Journal, I should explain that a demur-
rer may be described as a so-what pleading. It amounts about to this: "We concede everything our
adversary says but point out that it does not make a case."
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furters, and continued to be one for the rest of their lives. For what it
suggests of Felix's qualities and Marion's response to them, compare a
single gentle question put by Dr. Murray with the totality of Hirsch's
"demonstration":
Has F.F.'s interest in human beings, his quest for mettle and frater-
nity . . . .[his] keeping up the . ..cords of fellowship [been sur-
passed by a still higher] degree of intimacy . . . reserved . . . for his
love's center, his beautiful wife, Marion, whose mysterious inward-
ness of spirit, provided the balancing complementary pole to his ex-
pansive openness?' 8
Or compare what Tom Beasley, another viewer of Felix and Marion
from inside their household, had to say. Mr. Beasley-de jure the Jus-
tice's messenger at the Court, de facto man Friday, intendant g~nral,
chauffeur, and sometime companion for both-saw incomparably more of
the Frankfurters at unguarded moments than anyone else. Here, utterly at
odds with Hirsch's judgment on their relationship, is his account, relayed
by Garson Kanin, of outings they were able to have together during Fe-
lix's last months:
Tom recalls these times happily: "They'd sit there ... riding
along, and holding hands, these two ... loving people-and he'd
point things out . . . as if [he] were a . . .guide-he'd get all ex-
cited. . . the way he did-all involved-and she'd-well, you know,
she'd make all the right sounds." '
Enough on what Hirsch asserts Felix's ethos and behavior did to
Marion. To those who said "Enough" several pages back, I apologize for
so much length. My excuse is this: Hirsch surveys several other important
character-revealing relationships in Felix Frankfurter's life, applying to
them the same method-conscientious reading and analysis of every bit of
relevant information he can lay his hands on-as he does to Felix in rela-
tion to Marion; to be made to follow a debate on every detail in Hirsch's
discourse on each of these relationships-with women in general, with his
father, mother, and brothers, with his mentor-elders, with his proteges,
disciples, students, and law clerks, and with his peers at the Supreme
Court-would tax the patience of the most tolerant reader, and so I have
tried to pin down every strand of Hirsch's tapestry of Felix as a wife-
traumatizer and leave methodical response to this part of the book at that.
18. Murray, The Humanity of This Man, in FELIX FRANKFURTER-A TRIBUTE, supra note 11,
at 10, 14.
19. Kanin, FF Toward the End, supra note 11, at 560.
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But a few unsystematic observations on the other relationships just have
to be made. When, for example, Hirsch sets out a short paragraph of
snippets from Frankfurter's personal writings-one from his 1911 diary
and three others from a letter of 1924 to Marion-and concludes from
them alone, a body of proof not only too small but also too ambiguous and
too specifically focussed on particular women to be persuasive, that
"Frankfurter's attitude toward women in general was quite condescend-
ing,"2 I cannot let that get by. The fact is-and here I realize I am com-
pulsively opposing say-I against says-he, no further documentation being
available-that Frankfurter's attitude towards women ranged from Ed-
wardian gallanterie, which he dealt out rather freely, to chivalric adora-
tion, which he reserved for Marion.2 1
On Frankfurter's family relationship, I give Professor Hirsch this: The
Enigma brings together more facts about Frankfurter and his family dur-
ing his boyhood and his twenties than any other publication; and, without
saying so explicitly, makes it clear that Felix was felicitously named, that
happiness-which, a half-century later, Archibald MacLeish was to call
"the quality above all others which distinguished ...his life" 22-took
him early as a votary.
But Hirsch apparently cannot leave well enough alone. He not only
refuses to take at face value Frankfurter's own words on his happiness as
a boy and young man, but twists them into a construction that they simply
will not bear. For example, he sees Frankfurter's comment to an inter-
viewer for the Columbia Oral History Project, that "the greatest debt I
owe my parents is that they left me alone almost completely," as an ex-
pression "of resentment at having been neglected. ' 23 And he finds in the
"absence of letters in Frankfurter's files between him and his brothers" a
suggestion of "less than complete harmony within the Frankfurter
family. '24
Not leaving well enough alone is also the main weakness in Hirsch's
treatment of Frankfurter's relationship with his three mentors, Henry
Stimson, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Louis Brandeis. After drawing a
charming picture of the younger man and the older men in unguarded
communion with each other on law and life and whatever else their aspi-
20. P. 85.
21. I can hear Professor Hirsh saying: "How can you know all this?" My answer. I admit that
all this is unknowable, but it is my belief, a belief arising from twenty-five years of close friendship
with both Frankfurters. See Isenbergh, Reminiscences of FFas a Friend, 51 VA. L. REV. 564 (1965).
22. Proceedings In the Supreme Court of the United States in Memory of Felix Frankfurter, 382
U.S. xix (1965).
23. P. 16.
24. P. 216 n.8. Curiously, the book does not mention the Justice's sister Stella, doubtless an inval-
uable source of Frankfurteriana.
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rations and good works brought to mind, The Enigma goes on to scrounge
about, as it does in other spheres of Frankfurter's life, for some counter-
vailing ignobility.
Hirsch seems to be satisfied that he found what he was looking for. In
comparing two letters Frankfurter wrote in 1921, one to Stimson, the
other to Holmes, he notes that "Frankfurter's tone to Holmes is much
gentler than his tone to Stimson."25 And then, although he has at hand
information that provides simple, straightforward, and complete reasons,
not in the least invidious, for this difference of tone, he tars it as "sug-
gesting that the Justice was by now a more important relationship to
Frankfurter."'"
To say that Hirsch had information at hand explaining the gentler tone
to Holmes is putting it kindly. How could he have been less than vividly
aware that the very footnote27 in which he suggests venality as a determi-
nant of Frankfurter's loyalty to a friend reveals that the two letters that
Frankfurter was answering were also different in tone? Holmes's was
sympathetic, a statement of concern that Frankfurter had been unfairly
criticized for supporting unpopular causes. Stimson's was, in Hirsch's
own words, "a stinging rebuke."2 Indeed, one could say it was an in-
stance of the unfairness that had bothered Holmes, for it scolded Frank-
furter for permitting his name to be used in support of a piece of Bolshe-
vist propaganda that, in fact, Frankfurter had not endorsed. An
independent explanation, also noninvidious, of Frankfurter's gentler tone
to Holmes, an explanation that Hirsch ought to have known, is simply
this: in 1921 Frankfurter was thirty-nine years old, Stimson was fifty-
four, and Holmes was eighty.
Another aspect of his treatment of those two letters of 1921 may dimin-
ish faith in Hirsch's reliability even more than his unfounded leap to a
suggestion that Frankfurter would dump Stimson as soon as he found
Holmes "more important." Possibly, compassion for an author beset by a
huge skein of curly threads he had to straighten could induce tolerant
critics, if there are such, to condone resort to that spurious nasty explana-
tion when a solid decent one was indicated. But Hirsch's explanation is
not just spurious and nasty. Its efficacy with his readers depends upon his
implanting in their minds the premise that Frankfurter's friendship with
Stimson had waned.
The fact is that Frankfurter's friendship with Stimson continued undi-
minished until Stimson's death in 1950. Moreover, Hirsch reveals that he
25. P. 224 n.31.
26. Id.
27. P. 223 n.31.
28. P. 74.
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knew this. Further on in The Enigma-enough further on so that a non-
specialist reader could not be expected to relate the text back to what was
said of the Stimson-Frankfurter exchange of letters in 1921 29-Hirsch re-
counts that in 1932, Frankfurter, in his role as recruiter for the newly
elected FDR, "began at the top, by arranging meetings between Roosevelt
and Henry Stimson ... [and] was instrumental in the appointment of
Stimson as Roosevelt's secretary of war."30 Still further on, he quotes the
following entry from Stimson's diary, dated January 4, 1941, twenty
years after the correspondence readers were invited to regard as evidence
that Frankfurter's friendship with Stimson was already on the wane:
[Frankfurter] gave me a . . .message as to my relations with the
President [Roosevelt] and begged me to . . .seek out more opportu-
nities for more talks with him . . . I told him that I had been
keeping away because I did not like to bother him. He said that was
wrong-that he was a lonely man and that he was rather proud and
didn't like to ask people to come to him but that he was sure that he
would welcome my approaches if I would make them."
I cannot leave what Hirsch barbarously calls "the mentor-mentee rela-
tionship" 32 without begging those who have stayed thus far to hear me out
on one other feature of this part of the book. Hirsch reiterates as if it were
as incontestable as the date of Frankfurter's birth that not only toward his
mentors, but toward anyone whose goodwill he wanted, he was a sycho-
phant. Thus, of Frankfurter's "political style" he says:
The most obvious manifestation of this style was his constant resort
to flattery. He flattered Henry Morgenthau on their trip to Turkey;
he flattered Stimson, Holmes, and Brandeis; he flattered Marion
when she was ill; he flattered his colleagues at Harvard; he flattered
FDR and the men around him; he flattered his brethren on the
Court."
And again: "It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Frankfurter flat-
tered those he felt would be useful to his cause.13
It is not at all difficult to avoid that conclusion. No more needs to be
done than to look critically at what Hirsch reveals as his main source: a
canard about Frankfurter that Max Freedman unwittingly-in the full
29. Hirsch's discussion of the Stimson-Frankfurter exchange of 1921 is at pp. 74-75; his account
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sense of that word, alas3"-gave currency to in 1967. In his book on the
correspondence between Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Frankfurter,
Freedman, otherwise a Frankfurterophile, makes much of the Justice's
effusiveness in praising the President: "Frankfurter . . laid on flattery
with a trowel. Sometimes the flattery . . . may seem . . . repugnant. '"36
Although Freedman goes on to say that "Roosevelt needed this praise and
Frankfurter thought he deserved it," offering this addendum as "their de-
fense, if any is needed," Hirsch quotes only the accusatory part of the
passage, which he treats as confirmation by "the most ardent of Frank-
furter's admirers" of his thesis that Frankfurter was a sycophant.
Hirsch's other "support" adds nothing to his case, and parts of it may
even subtract. His very first allusion to Frankfurter's propensity to flat-
ter,37 as if it were a fact beyond contest, may put some readers off; the
only underpinning he provides-Frankfurter's statement that he was re-
volted by "the boot-licking deference" paid to E.M. Harriman by his law-
yers-is of no help to establish flattery as a frequent component of Frank-
furter's own behavior toward others. And many of his other allegations
that Frankfurter was a flatterer-there are at least twenty in the
book-could affect his readers in the same way.
Sometimes-as when Hirsch cites a truly and deservedly reverential let-
ter to Stimson38 or Holmes3"-the documentation he presents shows no
flattery at all; sometimes-as when he reports that Frankfurter wrote to
Stimson "without the usual flattery". 0-it is not what the documentation
shows but the absence of any documentation at all that may lose him part
of his audience, and sometimes-as when he comments upon Frank-
furter's reaction, noted above, to the servility of lawyers to E. M. Harri-
man, or Frankfurter's observations on the susceptibilty of Henry Morgen-
thau4' and T. Reed Powell 42 to flattery, or Frankfurter's firing a secretary
35. 1 have argued elsewhere that by overstating and under-explaining Frankfurter's compliments
to Roosevelt, Freedman let Frankfurter down; and that his "defense" seemed to concede merit in the
charge of sycophancy when at worst Frankfurter was guilty of bad form in making immoderate state-
ments of encouragement to his most admired friend, then burdened with the world's heaviest responsi-
bilities. See Isenbergh, Claims of History? Or What the Market will Bear? 45 VA. Q. REV. 345, 351-
52 (1968). Compare also Dean Acheson's observation in an unpublished letter dated December 16,
1968, to a fellow admirer of Frankfurter: "FF. . .thought of FDR as in his boyhood he thought of
the Emperor Franz-Joseph and treated him in a way somewhere between Lord Melbourne's and
Disraeli's treatment of Queen Victoria. Itmade me squirm but in a way-though not wholly-I
understood it."
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who heaped flattery on him,'43 or even Frankfurter's making a joke about
flattery41-neither the charge nor its documentation really bears upon the
kind of buttering up to others for the purpose of advancing one's own
causes that Hirsch attributes to him.
In Frankfurter's relationship with his proteges, disciples, students, and
law clerks, Hirsch sees him as a snob and a Svengali-a snob because he
devoted "most of his attention to the brightest," 45 and a Svengali because
he "was overly paternalistic and authoritarian toward them, sometimes
ignoring their best interests.1 46 Once again one must ask whether Hirsch's
facts are accurate and whether, to the extent that they are, they prove
what he says they do. Surely, Frankfurter "devoted . . .attention to the
brightest," as what teacher would not, especially if he were himself one of
the brightest at one of the brightest schools? But most of his attention? Of
the hundreds of lawyers who owed their first jobs to Frankfurter-my
figure derives from a moderate assumption of twenty a year for each of
the twenty-five years he was a law professor-not more than one in five
could have been on the Harvard Law Review and at or near the top of
the class. The bald assertion that most of Frankfurter's attention went to
the prize boys is not enough to make Hirsch's guess a fact. Even if it were
a fact, the further fact that almost from the beginning Frankfurter had
thrust upon him the role of finding the best young lawyers for the most
challenging young lawyers' jobs would save him from a charge of gratui-
tous elitism.
To back up his allegation of "Frankfurter's paternalistic domination of
. ..disciples,' 7 Hirsch offers only two pieces of evidence, both utterly
lacking in probative force. The first-duly acknowledged as a paraphrase
of a passage in Lash's book on Frankfurter*8-is the opinion of "Mrs.
Mark Howe, the wife of the man ... [who] was instructed [by Frank-
furter] to undertake the Holmes biography," that that undertaking "was
.. .not good for him."'"9 The second-it too is lifted with due acknowl-
edgment from another source1°-is also merely a statement of opinion, al-
beit of Mrs. Frankfurter's opinion, not that Frankfurter dominated any-
one, but that his devotion could have harmful effects: "Even Marion
recognized that Frankfurter's relationships were not always good for the
43. Pp. 89-90.




48. See J. LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 54-55 (1975).
49. P. 88.
50. Kanin, Trips to Felix, supra note 11, at 56.
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recipient; Frankfurter's loyalty she once said, 'is sometimes a curse.'
If one looks into this citation further, it will inevitably lead to a feeling
of having been had. For Garson Kanin's account, from which Hirsch
draws the quotation from Mrs. Frankfurter, makes it plain that she was
referring to Frankfurter's loyalty not to people but to activities, activities
she thought imprudent for him to continue after having his stroke; and
that the curse she was talking about was not upon others but upon Frank-
furter himself. Once bitten, twice shy. For the rest of the book, it is hard
to take any of Hirsch's judgments without suspicion.
It is not only the skimpiness and irrelevancy of what he offers as sup-
porting data that deflate Hirsch's thesis that Frankfurter dominated the
lives of younger men. History does-history known to anyone old enough
to have read newspapers during FDR's years as President. Like many of
my contemporaries I can easily muster up a list of, say, twenty lawyers
who joined the New Deal with some encouragement or impulsion from
Frankfurter and who went on to national prominence, but I cannot think
of one of whom it can fairly be said that Frankfurter dominated his life.
Nor, it seems, can Professor Hirsch. The "[s]cores of people [who] ended
up in Washington through Frankfurter's influence or with his help ''s2 are
a recurrent topic throughout the book. Always they are, to quote one of
Hirsch's own illustrative lists, "men like James Landis, Alger Hiss,
Charles Wyzanski, and Thomas Oorcoran,"' 3 hardly a company sug-
gesting susceptibility to domination by anybody.
Hirsch's treatment of Frankfurter's relationship with his brethren on
the Court is a grand recapitulation. All the flaws of character he found in
the relationship between boy Felix and his family, between young man
Felix and Marion, between Felix at all ages and women in general, be-
tween neophyte Felix and his mentors, and between Professor Frankfurter
and his students, Hirsch finds in the relationship between Justice Frank-
furter and his judicial peers. So, if Hirsch's rhetoric worked, the picture of
Frankfurter at the summit of his career that one would carry from the
book is of a domineering, sycophantic, resentful, and manipulative egoist.
I believe that Hirsch is dead wrong in all of this: in finding Frankfurter
domineering when he was compassionate, sycophantic when he tried to
make others feel better about themselves, resentful when, exceptionally, he
held back expressions of affection, and manipulative when he meant only
to be helpful.
Taken together, Hirsch's epithets present a character who exploits his
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listen. As an observer, beneficiary, and-how shall I put it-occasional
not-so-gently bruised victim of his way of dealing with others, a way com-
bining personal tenderness and intellectual ferocity as I had never seen
them combined elsewhere, I long ago resolved the enigma or enigmas of
Felix Frankfurter quite differently from Professor Hirsch. A few months
after Frankfurter's death, I exposed my resolution as follows:
FF's double life was no secret. While he never flaunted his love
affair with humankind, Mrs. F and his close friends knew all. But
lawyers in general did not, a circumstance of ironic effect in that the
decent respect they showed for his privacy had unfortunate conse-
quences for FF. By and large, lawyers saw Mr. Justice Frankfurter
very much as Harvard Law School students had seen Professor
Frankfurter. On the bench as in class, he was a mental juggernaut
S. .. It is easy to understand why on occasion a performance of FF
which struck some as magnificent struck others as nasty.
That this forensic Genghis Khan could be a doting uncle at home
was unbelievable to those who knew only the public figure ....
Conversely, the thousands-and there were thousands, so vast was
his embrace-exposed only to his gentler side thought the many tales
of Felix fulminans were a calumny.
. . . FF, more consistently than any other person I have ever en-
countered, gave everyone his due. If you had any merit. . . he saw
it. If you had faults . . . FF was not only sensitive to them, but
sympathetic and really interested in how they affected your life and
the lives of others. If you were not much on your own either way,
but represented a class of similar plebes, FF treated you as an am-
bassador, so to speak, of your economic or spiritual or racial or eth-
nic country, always according you a respect you did not deserve. And
if you were just a run-of-the-mill nonentity, FF warmed you with
his affection, because, after all, you were alive, and he loved life in
any form."
Hirsch's far different view, his seeing pursuit of self-interest where I
saw love of humanity, sets the tone, direction, and value of The Enigma.
For it is Frankfurter in relation to other people rather than Frankfurter
coming to grips with law, government, and politics that Hirsch makes his
main focus. This is quite appropriate, too, for a book that announces itself
as an application of "psychological theory to biography" in an attempt to
reach an accurate psychological assessment of its subject.55 But if the in-
ferences Hirsch draws from his study of Frankfurter's most psyche-re-
vealing relationships are as mistaken as I have tried to show them to
54. Isenbergh, supra note 21, at 565-67.
55. Pp. 6-7.
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be-that is to say, if his starting materials are hopelessly skewed-there is
no point in going on to his analytical and evaluative next steps.
Those nevertheless willing to go on may share some of the doubts I
have about the theoretical aspects of his exegesis. Acknowledging that
"choice of a psychological theory for the biographer poses a difficult prob-
lem," Hirsch resolves it by embracing "ego psychology," which he de-
scribes as one of several "clinically tested theories" to be viewed "as com-
plementary to . . Freudian analysis, rather than as a refutation," and
also "as a general intellectual movement within clinical psychology devel-
oped, at least in part, in reaction to the often overwhelming problem of
evidence in Freudian theory.""
On its derivation-from Erik Erikson and Karen Horney-Hirsch is
more specific, as he is on its application. Every act and attitude of Frank-
furter he considers, every one of Frankfurter's successes, failures, joys,
sorrows, affections, hostilities, worries, serenities, engagements, indiffer-
ences, and sensitivities, he presents as an instance of development or disin-
tegration of "self-image"-the Horneyan term5-or formation or diffu-
sion of "identity"-the Eriksonian. 8 If the formularized portrait that
emerges has any vitality, it is the vitality of a toad-all warts, no flesh
and blood, no spirit, some darting cleverness in self-preservation, and oth-
erwise no concern for fellow creatures or their world.
Hirsch's grand conclusion about Frankfurter, expressed in the language
readers of The Enigma become familiar with early in the book, is this:
Frankfurter can only be understood. . . psychologically. . . as rep-
resenting a textbook case of a neurotic personality: someone whose
self-image is overblown and yet . . [someone who] for several...
years. . . could not decide who and what he was and thus. . . was
led to develop a compensating, "idealized" self-image in which he
exaggerated his political skills and talents. His political style . ..
resulted from that self-image ....
* , * Because his self-image was inflated, and because his psycho-
logical peace rested upon that self-image, Frankfurter could not ac-
cept serious . . . opposition ....
* * .He was. . . confronted [at the Supreme Court], late in life,
with a serious challenge to his self-image; he reacted in a manner
affecting both his relations with his colleagues and the content of his
jurisprudence. 9
56. P. 215 n.14.
57. See, e.g., p. 7. There must be at least a hundred references to Frankfurter's "self-image" in
the book. I gave up counting about halfway through. My total then was 63.
58. See, e.g., p. 7. If there are fewer references to Frankfurter's "identity" than to his "self-
image," it cannot be by many.
59. Pp. 5-6.
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Justice Tom Clark, Frankfurter's colleague on the Court for eighteen
years, has given a quite different explanation of how and why Frank-
furter affected not only the colleagues and jurisprudence Hirsch refers to
but, in Clark's words, "the quality of his day":
He did it not only through his scholarship, his dedication to the law,
and his judicial self-restraint but also through his conversations, his
lively wit, and his warm friendship.
...[H]e was truly a man who understood the "still, sad music of
humanity."6°
Justice John Harlan has given a still different explanation of what he
calls Frankfurter's "enduring . . . enrich[ment of] the law" and his
"profound impact on the contemporary scene":
[O]ne of the things that shines brightly and consistently throughout
the whole of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's judicial work is a fierce de-
termination to keep his own ideologies and predilections out of the
decision of cases. Whether the result arrived at in any cause c~lbre
might turn out to be "liberal" or "conservative" in popular estima-
tion was of no concern to him whatever. One could point to many
instances where he felt compelled to decide a case quite contrary to
his personal tastes.
The objectivity for which Mr. Justice Frankfurter unceasingly
strove was something grander than impartiality of the kind that
comes simply from faithful adherence to precedent or pure reason.
He brought to bear on his judgments a deep understanding of the
nature and values of our federalism; a scrupulous observance of the
boundaries between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches
of the government; a dispassionate approach to the conflicting forces
always present in a dynamic economy; and a sensitive regard for the
balance that must ever be achieved in a free society between individ-
ual rights and governmental power. All of these things were at once
nourished, tempered, and brought into perspective by wide-ranging
scholarship; respect for the views of others and open-mindedness in
debate; the kind of humility which in the quest for progress seeks to
link the promise of the future with the lessons of the past; and the
sort of intellectual integrity which in the search for truth relentlessly
sets itself against plausible self-deceptions. The end product was pro-
fessional excellence of high degree and uncommon wisdom which re-
flected itself not alone in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's decisions on
great legal issues but also in the eagerness of many in fields other
than the law to obtain his advice.'
60. Clark, My Brother Frankfurter, 51 VA. L. REV. 549, 549 (1965).
61. Harlan, The Frankfurter Imprint as Seen by a Colleague, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1962).
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Because Justice Harlan's observations also bear on another theme of
The Enigma, less central and pervasive than Frankfurter's psyche but im-
portant nevertheless, one more short detour has to be taken. When I as-
serted that Hirsch, quite appropriately, pays more attention to Frank-
furter's persona than to his deeds, 2 I did not mean to suggest that the
book is inadequate on Frankfurter's career. On the contrary, Hirsch pro-
vides a solid compendium of Frankfurter as lawyer, teacher, guru,
scholar, and adviser of presidents. But with respect to Frankfurter as a
Justice of the Supreme Court, Hirsch is beyond the pale of disciplined
scholarly discourse. He reveals himself as unqualified for the elementary
juridical analysis prerequisite to appraisal of a Justice's work.
The judicial performance that Justice Harlan admired because it re-
flected "determination to keep [Frankfurter's] own ideologies . . . out of
the decision," "scrupulous observance" of separation of powers, and "re-
spect for the views of others," Hirsch dismisses as pervasively tainted by
excessive "judicial self-restraint," excessive because "stretched" to such a
"degree [that] he ignored . . . his own belief system."63 Hirsch seems to
think that when Frankfurter took judicial positions contrary to "his own
thinking [and] commitment," it had to be in "anger," anger arising from
"his attitude toward his liberal opponents."" It never occurs to him that
Frankfurter could have taken those positions because he believed that an
honest reading of the Constitution required him to, and because he had
taken an oath prescribed by a federal statute to decide cases "agreeably to
the Constitution and laws of the United States""-not agreeably to "val-
ues that were . . . important to him.166
To return to Hirsch's major theme-if skewed facts and mechanically
applied theory have not deviated his "quest for an accurate psychological
assessment, 67 perhaps a subtler but yet more basic impetus has: as he
makes clear almost from the beginning of the book, H. N. Hirsch does not
like Felix Frankfurter. The result is that although, as I have noted, he
occasionally dashes off brief perfunctory lists of Frankfurter's endearing
qualities-"vibrant personality: witty, charming, warm, energized, spar-
kling . . . [with] scores of friends whom he loved and who loved
him".'8-whenever he comes to what he calls "the darker side to [Frank-
furter's] character,"'69 he invariably dwells on it, expatiates on it, and
62. See supra p. 1029.
63. P. 210.
64. Id.
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makes it vivid with detail. Indeed, if asked now to guess which of the
enigmas of Felix Frankfurter Hirsch had in mind for his title, I would
say it was that "darker side," which he perceives as a neuroticism of ex-
traordinary intensity and pervasiveness.
Not for a moment do I concede that Hirsch comes close to supporting
his grand conclusion: that Frankfurter was "a textbook case of a neurotic
personality."70 But if I were to grant this arguendo (and also that dubious
gathering of data and application of theory have not by themselves ruined
the book), I would still have to count The Enigma as a dangerous failure.
A failure because it conceals too much: if Frankfurter was superlative in
his neuroticism, he was also superlative in his humanity. Dangerous be-
cause it may mislead the unwary: someone who has not looked into any of
the writing1 on Frankfurter, writing not in the least notable for silence
about his foibles but overwhelmingly eulogistic in its prevailing tone, runs
the risk, on reading Hirsch's elaborate caricature, decked out as it is in
the caparison of scholarship, of confusing it with the character of Felix
Frankfurter.
70. P. 5; see also p. 210.
71. See, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER: A TRIBUTE, supra note 11; J. LASH, supra note 48; Proceed-
ings in the Supreme Court of the United States, in Memory of Felix Frankfurter, 382 U.S. xix
(1965); In Memoriam: Felix Frankfurter, 51 VA. L. REV. 547 (1965) (symposium); Articles, 76
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1962).
1033
Slave Law: History & Ideology
The American Law of Slavery, 1810-1860: Considerations of
Humanity and Interest. By Mark Tushnet. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1981. Pp. 262. $20.00 (paper, $9.50).
Alan Watsont
A book review frequently reveals as much about the reviewer as about
the book. In reviewing an avowedly Marxist work on the American law of
slavery, I feel compelled to express something about myself. I am not an
expert on the American law of slavery but I do know something about
Roman slave law. And while I think that I am not a Marxist, I share an
interest with them in certain problems, namely the relationship between
law and society and the evolution of legal rules. I believe that Marxism
has in general been badly served by its legal scholars, whose work is rich
in theory but poor in historical legal knowledge and attention to detail.
Finally, I would contend that it is difficult to write with insight and accu-
racy about law and society unless one takes a long-term view, often ex-
tending over centuries, and unless one also bears in mind analogous situa-
tions and conditions in other societies.
This last contention should be expanded. The impact of purely local
and contemporary conditions and ideology on legal change can be esti-
mated accurately only if one adopts a broader perspective. To give a very
recent example: In a work celebrating the tercentenary of Stair's Institu-
tions of the Law of Scotland,' F.H. Lawson explains Stair's omission of
any treatment of criminal law in terms of Scotland and of Stair's interests.
The explanation seems convincing and fully satisfactory until one notices
that similar seventeenth century Institutes from Germany, France, Hol-
land, Belgium, and elsewhere frequently also omit discussion of criminal
law. Even for Scots law no explanation is likely to be wholly convincing
unless the phenomenon is examined in other contexts. This point is espe-
cially relevant for a book, like Mark Tushnet's,2 that is largely concerned
with ideology. If, for a rule or attitude prevailing in the ante-bellum
tProfessor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
1. Lawson, Stair from an English Standpoint, in STAIR TERCENTENARY STUDIES 234 (D.M.
Walker ed. 1981).




South, he provides explanations based on economic conditions, then the
explanations are at best only partially satisfactory if similar rules or atti-
tudes existed in a time and place where economic conditions differed.
The first chapter sets out Tushnet's conceptual framework describing
the slave system that existed in the South between 1810 and 1860. His
theory is complex, subtle, and ideologically determined. The primary ma-
terial conditions that shape interpretations of the world, he suggests, are
the social relations of production. The exchange of labor power for a wage
is the basic transaction of bourgeois society. The first characteristic of
bourgeois social relations is that they are partial: the employer is con-
cerned with the employee's life only insofar as it affects the employer's
system of production. By contrast, the slave-owner purchases the slave,
not just the slave's labor. The fundamental social relationship of a slave
society is total, engaging the full personalities of the slave-owner and the
slave.
Southern slave-owners, claims Tushnet, participated in not only a nas-
cent slave society but also a mature bourgeois society. Moreover, they
were constrained by their economic ties to bourgeois societies and, more
particularly, by the political ties the federal union imposed. These ties
suppressed open expression in Southern slave law of the assumptions that
people in a slave society need in order to interpret their world. This world
had a dual aspect: it was at the same time a world of both totalistic and
partial relationships. It was, in fact, a self-contradictory world.
This dichotomy, he continues, was reflected in the law. Southern slave
law attempted to allocate control over the slavery relationship to "senti-
ment," the individual and group morals of the master class. Had this allo-
cation been complete-although it could not be-it would have completely
removed the regulation of slavery from the law. Commercial dealings, on
the other hand, were regulated by law. "In a sense slave law asserted
jurisdiction only over market transactions, leaving other relationships to be
regulated by sentiment. Thus the law/sentiment dichotomy was not coin-
cidentally related to the market relations/slave relations dichotomy, but
was rather structurally derived from it."'
Tushnet finds a second salient characteristic of Southern slave law in
the unsuccessful attempt to confine the content of slave law solely to the
situation of slaves. But this "categorization" repeatedly failed because of
the contradictions in Southern slave society:
The fundamental structure of slave society required the allocation of
law to market relations, but because Southern slavery was part of a
3. Pp. 36-37.
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world capitalist system, the concept of law inevitably shaped the ide-
ology of master-slave relations. Thus, Southern judges were trying to
develop a law of slavery when only social control through sentiment
could have yielded a stable result. Categorization attempted to con-
fine slave law to the slave setting, but the enterprise was incompati-
ble with the logic of slavery, which entirely denied the relevance of
law to that setting.4
All in all I find the first chapter well argued. But, as I hope to show,
Tushnet's Marxist perspective, explaining legal phenomena by reference
to the dualistic nature of the Southern economy, is fundamentally uncon-
vincing. The law/sentiment dichotomy, which Tushnet links to the South-
ern economic dichotomy (mature bourgeois/nascent slave society), has ex-
isted elsewhere without the economic dichotomy-notably in ancient
Rome, which was a mature slave society but scarcely even a nascent bour-
geois society. Furthermore, the characteristic of repeated but failing at-
tempts at categorization has surfaced frequently in legal history, and is
specifically linked with neither slavery nor a self-contradictory society.
I would like to deal briefly with Tushnet's second characteristic. The
problem of categorization exists in any legal system that develops, largely
without legislative intervention, a response to a new institution. Law de-
velops mainly by borrowing; in the case of borrowing from within the
legal system, this means development by analogy. But the analogy may
not be easy to apply and may have to be used differently in different
situations. Indeed, different analogies may have to be drawn. The legal
position of the monk developed in the Middle Ages in just this way. The
best analogy for the monk was thought to be to the Roman slave; thus, the
monk, like the slave, could not be a party to a law suit, could not witness
a will, could with the consent of his superior hold property as if it were
his own, was not to be cruelly punished by his superior, and so on. But
the analogy was the product of time and was by no means thought com-
plete; in some matters the correct analogy for a monk was held to be to
the Roman filius familias, a son of any age under the power of his father.'
The categorization of slave law, however, always presents particular
problems. There is no way to avoid the fact that the slave is property, and
yet also has volition. In some circumstances the most satisfactory analogy
will be with a thing, while in other contexts a free person will be the
more apt comparison.
In the second chapter Tushnet analyzes four cases from Southern state
4. P. 42.
5. See NICOLAS EVERARDI (1462-1532), LOCI ARGUMENTORUM LEGALES, at locus 24 (Frankfurt
am Main 1648).
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appellate courts to demonstrate his thesis. He attempts to show that these
cases reveal a continuing but not wholly successful attempt by courts to
distinguish between law and sentiment as modes of regulating social inter-
actions involving slaves. The further removed from a commercial transac-
tion are the circumstances, the more Tushnet perceives sentiment replac-
ing law as the mode of regulation. The cases also show, he argues, that
the primary method of harmonizing law and sentiment was the attempted
use of rigid categories to confine the law of slavery to slaves. If one consid-
ers his thesis only from the local and temporal standpoint of the South
between 1810 and 1860, it would be hard to disprove. He expressly
claims that the "structural parallelism, market/plantation and law/senti-
ment . . . lurks beneath the surface of the cases. It occasionally emerges,
but in the end it cannot sustain itself."6 Against this type of argument,
with its built-in ambiguity, it would be futile to produce contradictory
evidence from the same place and time. In order to refute Tushnet's
Marxist explanation of categorization and the law/sentiment dichotomy,
one must either show that the analysis of the four cases he thinks support
his thesis is inaccurate or implausible, or demonstrate the existence of
similar rules and attitudes at times and in societies where his ideology
could have no explanatory value.
Tushnet first analyzes an 1858 North Carolina case, Ponton v. Wil-
mington & Weldon Railroad Co.7 Ponton hired his slave out to the rail-
road company to work as a brakeman on a freight train. The train was
shunted onto a siding, the switchman negligently failed to return the rails
to the correct position, and the following passenger train thus was also
shunted onto the siding, causing a collision in which Ponton's slave was
killed at his station. Judge Ruffin's per curiam opinion for the North
Carolina Supreme Court denied Ponton damages because of the fellow-
servant rule: a master is not liable to a servant for injuries arising from
the negligence of a fellow servant if the master has used ordinary care in
the employment of the fellow servant.
The starting point of Tushnet's argument is the rationale for the fel-
low-servant rule offered by Judge Lemuel Shaw in an 1842 Massachu-
setts case, Farwel v. Boston and Worcester Railroad Corp.' Shaw had
claimed that (1) a servant's compensation is adjusted to take account of
risks, including that of negligence of a fellow servant, and (2) when an
employee found himself working beside another employee who was care-
less, the former could inform the employer and if the employer failed to
act the employee could leave his service. Thus, notes Tushnet, Shaw pro-
6. Pp. 44-45.
7. 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 245 (1858).
8. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842).
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vided both a contract and a tort rationale for the fellow-servant rule., In
Ponton, however, Judge Ruffin relied only on the contract rationale:
"[T]he servant when he engages to serve undertakes, as between him and
his master, to run all the ordinary risks of the service . . . ."' Tushnet
finds it "striking" that Ruffin invoked only the contract rationale and said
nothing about the tort rationale, although Ruffin was relying heavily on
established authority. Tushnet's explanation is that the servant behavior
posited by the tort rationale would in this instance have breached a basic
assumption of slave society: it would require a slave, the servant, to initi-
ate contact with a free man, the master. In reality such slave-initiated
contact happened often, Tushnet states, but the law could not take cogni-
zance of it. Thus, Ponton treats law and sentiment as separate spheres of
regulation.
But Tushnet's argument from silence is not convincing. That sort of
argument is persuasive only when particular and strong reasons seem to
impel the discussion that is omitted. Such reasons are absent here. On the
contrary, use of the so-called tort rationale in Ponton would in fact have
been quite inappropriate, for a reason having nothing to do with the ser-
vant's status as a slave. The tort rationale, relying on the servant's ability
to inform his master of the negligence of his fellow servant, has no rele-
vance where, as in Ponton, the servant and fellow servant do not work
together, for in such a case the servant has no way of knowing that his
fellow servant is careless.
It is, of course, true that the injured servant in Farwel did not work
beside his negligent fellow servant, and that Shaw was using the tort ra-
tionale as a general justification for the fellow-servant rule. Fellow ser-
vants can often guard against each other's misconduct: "By these means,
the safety of each will be much more effectually secured, than could be
done by a resort to the common employer for indemnity in case of loss by
the negligence of each other."" But there is no secure basis here on which
Tushnet can erect an argument from silence. To begin with, in attempting
to establish new law, the judge may make use of an argument of general
principle. But once the law is established, as was the fellow-servant rule
by the time of Ponton, the general principle need not be spelled out in
every subsequent case, especially where the principle is unnecessary and
does not obviously fit the facts of the case. Second, as a general justifica-
tion for the fellow-servant rule, the rationale is weak because frequently,
as in Farwel and Ponton, the injured and negligent servants are not em-
9. I am uneasy with Tushnet's characterization since it appears that Shaw thought both rationales
were in contract.
10. 51 N.C. (6 Jones) at 246.
11. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 59.
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ployed in the same department of duty. Shaw naturally discussed thiis ob-
jection but dismissed it on the ground that it would be extremely difficult
to establish a practical rule whose application depends on a lack of such
division of departments. Shaw then continued:
Besides, it appears to us that the argument rests upon an assumed
principle of responsibility which does not exist. The master, in the
case supposed, is not exempt from liability, because the servant has
better means of providing for his safety, when he is employed in
immediate connexion with those from whose negligence he might
suffer; but because the implied contract of the master does not extend
to idemnify the servant against the negligence of any one but himself;
and he is not liable in tort, as for the negligence of his servant, be-
cause the person suffering does not stand towards him in the relation
of a stranger, but is one whose rights are regulated by contract ex-
press or implied. The exemption of the master, therefore, from lia-
bility for the negligence of a fellow servant, does not depend exclu-
sively upon the consideration, that the servant has better means to
provide for his own safety, but upon other grounds. 2
Thus, since Shaw himself recognized the weakness of this rationale, it is
only to be expected that a judge of Ruffin's ability would not use it in an
instance where it was particularly inappropriate and where another per-
fectly good rationale was available. Third, this so-called tort rationale was
so unsatisfactory that many subsequent cases, of which Chicago and
Northwestern Railroad Co. v. Moranda" is perhaps the best known, held
that an employer would be liable for an injury to a servant caused by a
fellow servant in a different department of duty. Judge Ruffin showed
good sense in not using the rationale when it was not necessary. In sum,
no far-reaching conclusion can be drawn from Ruffin's omission of what
Tushnet calls the tort rationale.
If Tushnet's analysis is unconvincing here, then his failure to persuade
the reader has serious implications for his general theory. The case does
not treat law and sentiment as separate spheres of regulation. Yet
Tushnet claims that this separation was the primary aim of all Southern
slave law. This claim would be hard to prove or disprove, however, be-
cause as Tushnet himself states, the effort usually failed. Judge Ruffin
himself had only qualified success at maintaining the separation, and the
dichotomy between law and sentiment (in this case) was implicit and not
directly revealed. Since in any event the claim would be so hard to estab-
lish, it is unfortunate that the principal case adduced at best cannot be
12. Id. at 60-61.
13. 93 Il. 302 (1879).
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probative and may in fact be irrelevant.
Tushnet's second case is Gorman v. Campbell,1" decided by the Georgia
Supreme Court. Tushnet argues that "[w]hen conditions that allowed a
court to separate market relations and slave relations were less forceful
than in Ponton-when the judges were less talented than Judge Ruffin, or
the fact setting less obviously market oriented-the line between law and
sentiment blurred. Gorman v. Campbell .. . is a good illustration."' 5
Gorman hired out his slave, London, to work as a steamboat hand for
Campbell. Custom barred slaves from working in the water to remove
obstructions, but London was so working in the captain's presence for
about half an hour when the log on which he was standing began to
move. The captain then called to him several times and London jumped to
another log, but that log moved downstream and London was drowned.
Judge Lumpkin, writing for the Georgia Court, found for Gorman on the
ground that the captain was negligent in a contract of bailment.
Tushnet finds the case interesting because of an approach Judge
Lumpkin did not take, an approach that would have kept out what
Tushnet perceives as a strain of sentiment in a relationship that under the
traditional dichotomy would have been regulated by law. He argues that
the court could have developed a "fellow-servantlike approach" from its
insight that the relationship between owner and hirer was contractual:
The price of hiring a slave, it could be said, necessarily reflected the
various risks inherent in the enterprise. In particular, although the
contract might have specified the owner's intention that the slave
would be used for enumerated purposes, as a boathand for example,
the price would reflect the unavoidable fact that the cost of confining
the slave, a person with a mind and a will, to those purposes would
be great.16
This argument is over-stated. A fellow-servant approach could not have
been taken, of course, because the captain was the direct representative of
the hirer: his relationship with the slave was that of an employer, not a
fellow employee. Whatever risks the law might regard as inherent in the
enterprise and so reflected in the price of hiring or of wages, the risk of
negligence by the hirer or the employer has never been one.
But perhaps this misunderstands Tushnet. His argument may be that
the court could have proceeded to the same result by analogy to the fel-
low-servant doctrine. The price of the hire, under this view, would reflect
the supervisory costs of confining a slave to the tasks envisaged by the
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contract. This argument also fails, however. The very existence of the cus-
tom precludes assumption of this particular risk. The slave's being in the
water is barred simply because it is dangerous and hence costly to the
master. The slave derives no advantage from being in the water, unless he
otherwise expects some punishment from the hirer or hopes for some ben-
efit, again from the hirer. In the absence of a disaster, the hirer can only
gain from having the slave work in the water: Hence the existence of the
custom and its application against the hirer. Certainly the slave has voli-
tion, but its exercise may not be free. Even if it were, the point is scarcely
of relevance. The slave is not a party to the contract; rather, he is the
object of the contract and must be used in accordance with its express or
implied terms. Technically, this is not a hire of services (locatio oper-
arum) but a hire of a thing (locatio rel).
London worked in the presence of the captain, at work he should not
have been doing. The captain did not use the required ordinary diligence,
since he should not have permitted the slave to perform work regarded as
dangerous. As Judge Lumpkin states, "to neglect to exercise authority to
forbid a thing, is to permit it."' 7 Tushnet claims, however, that the basis
of the court's decision had nothing to do with contractual relations:
Unfortunately for Judge Lumpkin, the slave's supervisor, after ob-
serving the slave attempting to free the boat from the place where it
was grounded, ordered the slave to stop. At that point, no harm to
the slave had occurred. Only after the slave had defied his supervi-
sor's order did the log on which the slave was standing give way.
Although the facts as stated in the opinion are ambiguous, they sug-
gest that a jury could have concluded that the supervisor gave the
order in time for the slave to have escaped injury. The supervisor
then might not have exercised the proper level of care for the half-
hour before he gave the order to stop, but that failure would not
have a sufficiently close causal connection to the injury to make the
employer liable.18
I can understand none of this. The law at that time made a sharper dis-
tinction between contract and tort than we use today, and Lumpkin's deci-
sion seems to be based on contractual relations. The contract was one of
hire. The hirer breached an established custom of the trade, since slaves
were not to be used in the water. Hired property was thus used in a
forbidden way and damage ensued from that very use. A break in the
chain of causation would have been irrelevant; if the slave had fallen off
the log entirely as a result of his own negligence, the hirer would still
17. 14 Ga. at 142.
18. P. 52.
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have been liable because the use was prohibited.
The issue in the case was precisely the one addressed by Lumpkin: If a
hired slave undertakes work, not at the command but with the knowledge
of the hirer, that is forbidden because it is dangerous, precisely what steps
must the hirer take in order to satisfy the standard of care imposed by the
contract? Tushnet claims that the rules adopted in Gorman can be justi-
fied only because humanity demands it: "In Gorman, the rules of law
were rhetorically justified by reference to contract and sentiment, and
were analytically justifiable only by reference to sentiment." 9 On the con-
trary, it seems to me the rules were justifiable by and in fact based on
contract.
The third case Tushnet discusses is State v. Mann,0 from North Caro-
lina in 1829. A slave, Lydia, was hired out to John Mann for a year. She
committed some small offense, for which Mann was going to punish her.
She ran off, Mann called on her to stop, she did not, and Mann shot and
wounded her. Mann was charged with assault and battery, and the jury
instructed to convict if the "punishment . . . was cruel and unwarranta-
ble, and disproportionate to the offense committed by the slave ....
Writing for the North Carolina Supreme Court, Judge Ruffin reversed
the jury's conviction. At one point Tushnet quotes Ruffin extensively to
demonstrate the latter's refusal to accept the prosecution's analogy of pun-
ishment of child by parent, pupil by tutor, and apprentice by master.
Then Tushnet states:
The analogy to other domestic relations was rejected, then, be-
cause children and apprentices could learn from the consequences of
"headstrong passions" and because society would not suffer if par-
ents were punished for using excessive force to discipline their chil-
dren, whereas slaves would understandably rebel if their "passions"
went unchecked and the relation of master to slave would be under-
mined if the state intervened. Judge Ruffin relied on a court's inabil-
ity to draw lines between proper and excessive discipline to show just
how disruptive it would be to allow criminal prosecutions under any
circumstances ... .22
This passage, I think, contains several misunderstandings of Ruffin.
First, Ruffin's argument about moderate punishment of free persons was
not that they could learn from the consequences of headstrong passions
and that society would not suffer if parents were punished for using ex-
19. P. 53.
20. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829). See pp. 54-65.
21. Id. at 263.
22. Pp. 60-61.
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cessive force. Rather, Ruffin argued that the end in view in punishing the
free youth is his happiness. He is born to equal rights with his governor,
who has the duty of training him for the station he will assume among
free men. The natural means to this end is moral and intellectual instruc-
tion, to which the right of moderate punishment is added to make instruc-
tion effective. If moderate punishment fails, Ruffin states, it is better to
leave the free youth to his own headstrong passions and ultimate correc-
tion by the law. Second, contrary to Tushnet, Ruffin does not reject the
analogy because "slaves would understandably rebel if their 'passions'
went unchecked."2 Instead, for Ruffin the end of slavery "is the profit of
the master, his security and the public safety . . . ."" Moral and intellec-
tual instruction cannot convince the slave "what. . .the most stupid must
feel and know can never be true-that he is thus to labor upon a principle
of natural duty, or for the sake of his own personal happiness ....1-21
The right of moderate punishment alone is unavailing because the punish-
ment is not for the purpose of aiding moral instruction. As Ruffin says:
"Such obedience is the consequence only of uncontrolled authority over
the body. There is nothing else which can operate to produce the effect.
The power of the master must be absolute, to render the submission of the
slave perfect. '2 6
Third, Tushnet exaggerates when he states that Ruffin showed how
disruptive it would be to permit criminal prosecutions by pointing to the
inability of courts to draw the line between proper and excessive disci-
pline. But Ruffin does say it is difficult to know where a court might
properly begin: all powers of a master would probably be swept away if
the power of the master was to accord with justice. Ruffin's main argu-
ment for excluding criminal prosecutions of masters is that "[tihe slave, to
remain a slave, must be made sensible," and must understand "that there
is no appeal from his master," whose "power is in no instance usurped;
but is conferred by the laws of man at least, if not by the law of God., 2 7
In fact, Ruffin later suggests that the legislature might intervene to restrict
the powers of masters. 8
Although the point Tushnet is trying to make here seems confused, he
is again making much of the distinction between law and sentiment:
I have argued in the opening sections of this chapter that Southern
slave law strove to suppress overt recognition of the dichotomy of
23. P. 60.
24. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 266.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 267.
28. Id. at 268.
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sentiment and law. State v. Mann shows why: to talk about the di-
chotomy was, given the nature of Southern slave law, to force the
law to appear abhorrent."
But it is precisely here that Tushnet's Marxist analysis reveals itself as
fundamentally sterile. The economic conditions of the American South-a
mature bourgeois society combined with a nascent slave society-should
not be seen as the source of the decision and of Ruffin's arguments in
Mann. Rather, the facts of life in any society, of whatever economic pro-
file, that accepts slavery would compel a decision like Mann. Slavery ex-
ists for the benefit of the master, and moral education cannot teach the
slave otherwise; hence the master must have very extensive powers of pun-
ishment that the slave cannot question. The slave must obey without chal-
lenging the master. If the law is to intervene at all to restrict cruel treat-
ment, it will do so only with the utmost circumspection.
A comparison with ancient Rome is revealing. Through the long centu-
ries of the Roman Republic, when the legal system was fully mature,
there were no legal restrictions whatsoever on the power of the master
arbitrarily to punish and even to kill his own slave. With the Empire
came some restrictions, but even the Christian emperor Constantine de-
creed that there would be no investigation where a slave died after a beat-
ing by his master, "whether the punishment'was simply inflicted or ap-
parently with the intention of killing the slave."" Again, when slaves tried
to accuse or inform against their masters, "the assertion of such atrocious
audacity will be repressed at the very outset, a hearing will be denied
them, and they will be crucified."3 The lawmakers went a long way to
keep law out of relations between master and servant. But Rome was not
a society beset, in Tushnet's economic sense, by an internal contradiction.
It was a mature slave system. It is also worth noting that the Roman
jurists thought slavery contrary to morality. As Justinian defines it,
"[s]lavery is an institution of the law of nations by which, contrary to
nature, a person is subjected to the domination of another."32
Tushnet's fourth and last case is an 1818 decision from Louisiana,
Jourdan v. Patton.3 Jourdan's slave put out the one good eye of Patton's
slave. The trial court, finding Jourdan liable, ordered him to pay Patton
the value before injury of the now worthless slave, the slave's medical
expenses, and a lump sum and monthly payments for maintenance of the
slave. The court further held that the slave was to remain forever in Pat-
29. P. 62.
30. 9 CODE THEOD. 12.2.
31. Id. at 5.1.1.
32. INST. Jusr. 1.3.2.
33. 5 Mart. 615 (La. 1818). See Pp. 66-70.
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ton's possession. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed: once the full
value of the slave was paid, title would pass to Jourdan. Hence the award
for maintenance failed.
Tushnet comments:
The defendant's liability was predicated on some theory analogous to
failure to supervise his own slaves, which suggests some indifference
to the harm they might do. That indifference, the trial court surely
concluded, might well carry over to the maintenance of a useless
slave. It then made sense to leave the injured slave with his longtime
owner and to force the defendant to assume only the costs of mainte-
nance, but not the actual care. The latter course would, it seems,
have been dangerous to the slave. 4
Surely this is nonsense on various levels. First, Tushnet has no right,
without evidence or argument, to posit the theory on which the trial court
based liability. In fact, Tushnet in this case is demonstrably wrong-the
rule was simply taken from Spanish and French law, which in turn had
taken it from Roman law. There is every indication that in Roman law
the rationale was not failure to supervise. Indeed, the Louisiana rule is so
much a transplant that it retains from Roman law an option in the defen-
dant to surrender the wrongdoing slave instead of paying damages. 5 This
is impossible to justify if the basis of liability is failure to supervise. Sec-
ond, how does the rule itself suggest the master's indifference to harm that
his slaves might do? If a legal system had a rule, postulated on a failure to
supervise, of liability for damage of animals, one would not say that when
an animal caused damage and made the owner liable, the existence of that
rule suggests that the owner was indifferent to harm caused by his ani-
mals. Third, the likelihood that Jourdan would be indifferent to the wel-
fare of the blind slave has no place in the legal analysis. As a purely
practical matter it is, of course, reasonable to assume that Jourdan would
be relatively indifferent. The slave had no economic value to him, had
performed no previous services for him, and would have been thrust upon
him purely as a result of a legal decision. But this indifference, contrary to
Tushnet's suggestion, cannot be discovered as a result of legal argument.
Tushnet confuses legal rules with social realities. The judge is to decide in
accordance with legal rules. In Jourdan the judge fails to do so, and per-
haps for that he should be honored, but Tushnet's previous discussion has
(seemingly) been based upon legal rules. Tushnet goes so far as to claim
that it may have been dangerous to hand over the worthless slave to
34. P. 66.
35. DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS tit. 6, art. 22 (1808).
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Jourdan. Dangerous it may have been, but could the judge any more
properly have taken that danger into account than a present-day judge
could order that an individual with no police record be locked up on the
ground that psychiatrists think it is likely that he will commit crimes in
the future?
The Louisiana Supreme Court, as Tushnet rightly stresses, recognized
that "principles of humanity" would lead one to suppose that the mistress
of years' standing would treat her "miserable, blind slave" with more
kindness than would Jourdan.16 The Court nonetheless said that these
principles could not be taken into account, for the law clearly required
that the slave be handed over to Jourdan. But no tension between slave
society and bourgeois society can justifiably be discerned here. The same
conflicting claims of principles of humanity and legal rules exist in any
slave-owning society, even one without a hint of bourgeois modes of pro-
duction. Roman law again provides examples. For instance, the jurist
Paul writes:
If you killed my slave, I do not think that personal feelings should be
taken into account, [as] for instance if someone killed your natural
son [who is someone else's slave] whom you would be willing to buy
at a high price, [you should receive] only what he would be worth to
everyone . ... "
Humanity finally won out in a situation Javolenus discusses:
An owner left a legacy of five gold pieces to his slave: "Let my heir
give to my slave Stichus whom I have ordered in this will to be free
the five gold pieces which I owe him according to my account
books." Namusa writes that the reply of Servius was that nothing
was given as a legacy to the slave because a master could not owe his
slave anything. I think that following the intention of the master a
natural rather than a civil debt is to be looked for. And that is the
rule we follow."
Examples of such tensions in Roman law abound.
The heart of Tushnet's book, I believe, consists of the conceptual
framework in chapter 1, and the four cases analyzed in chapter 2 to illu-
minate the ideological underpinnings of Southern society. Yet, as I hope I
have demonstrated, the cases are analyzed wrongly in legal terms, and a
correct analysis cannot lead to Tushnet's result. Furthermore, the last two
36. 5 Mart. at 617.
37. DIG. JUST. 9.2.33. pr.
38. Id. at 35.1.40.3.
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cases illuminate tensions inherent in any slave society. They disclose noth-
ing about the particular ideological underpinnings of Southern society ex-
cept that the South contained slaves.
If the cases chosen by Tushnet do not support or illustrate his concep-
tual framework, then we may ask whether the framework is valid or nec-
essary. A simpler version, along the following lines, might well suffice. In
all slave systems, law and sentiment will each regulate some aspects of
slavery. The more the issue involves master and slave, the more in general
the law will not intervene; the more the issue involves the master (or a
person acting in place of the master) and a third party, the more the law
will regulate the parties' behavior. There will be a continuous tension in
law between the treatment of the slave as property and the recognition
that he is human or at least has volition. Such a thesis is sound, I believe,
though it does not tell one very much. But it cannot be accepted by a
Marxist, who must have a theory akin to Tushnet's. If the primary mate-
rial conditions that shape ideology are the social relations of production,
then the South, being both a mature bourgeois society and a nascent slave
society, would of necessity have contained an inner contradiction revealed
particularly in slave law. Tushnet's failure in his analysis of the cases,
however, should mean that the book will convince only those predisposed
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